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c h a p t e r 3
the austrIan army
lee eysturlId
D uring the long, on-again-off-again wars generated by the events of the French Revolution, the Habsburg monarchy would con-
tribute the largest single contingent of troops to the fight.1 For the 
Austrians, the wars fought over this nine-year period were a long-
term disaster. Entering the war with a small, professional army, 
the monarchy would constantly be at loose ends to find the financ-
ing and manpower to carry out the demands of a European-wide 
war. Worse yet, and critical to remember, was that the disparate 
Habsburg lands were incapable of the political revolution that had 
allowed a homogenous France to mobilize so many men and such 
vast resources. There could be no real appeal to nationalism, like 
in France, in a state that had over a dozen national and linguistic 
groups. Not only was Austria poor by French or English standards, 
but it was a thoroughly early modern state, incapable of internal, 
liberal political reform. The history of Austria’s army and its leaders 
in these wars is, then, one of reaction and, when it occurred, tem-
porary, superficial change. This said, and while the monarchy often 
saw defeat on the battlefield, its army’s ability to outlast its oppo-
nent allowed for its survival and eventual recovery.
When the Revolution first broke out in France, there was only 
modest concern in Vienna. Of far greater concern at the time were 
relations with Prussia and Russia over the so-called Second Partition 
of Poland. The Habsburg emperor Leopold II warned France of its 
belligerence in threatening Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette in 1791, 
but showed little inclination to war. But the Austrians misjudged 
the French, or at least the Directory’s, inclination for war, as events 
would show. The January 1792 demands for compliance with the old 
1756 Franco-Austrian alliance simply pushed the monarchy coop-
eration treaty with its old nemesis, Prussia. Then, rather unexpect-
edly, Leopold II, a lover of peace and an enlightened monarch, died. 
He was replaced by his oldest son, Francis II (later Francis I, emperor 
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of Austria). Young, inexperienced, and lacking his father’s prudence, 
Francis would be unable to stem the slide to war.2 Furious over the 
new, potential Prussian alliance and looking to discourage the other 
German states from participation, the Directory decided on war. On 
21 April 1792, it declared war on the king of Hungary and Bohemia.
To gain an understanding of the Habsburg army, it is necessary 
to try and first come to grips with the rather diverse, if not con-
fusing, nature of the monarchy itself. The empire sprawled across 
central Europe from what is today Belgium to southern Poland 
(Galicia) and from the Czech Republic (Bohemia) to the north-
ern states of Italy. The pillar of the monarchy’s holdings were the 
hereditary lands, the Erblande, which centered on what is now 
modern Austria.3 Added to this, though indirectly, was the large, 
powerful, but organizationally medieval state of Hungary, whose 
nobles jealously guarded their privileges. The title of Holy Roman 
emperor also gave, at least in theory, the Habsburg ruler access to 
the resources and armies of the numerous German states. However, 
while often evoked during the wars, the imperial title proved of 
little real use, as states like Bavaria, Saxony, and Brunswick, to 
name only three, would prove more than willing to seek political 
accommodation with the French when threatened. The Habsburg 
ruler therefore had to try and tie together the loyalties of Germans, 
Magyars, Czechs, Flemings and Walloons, Poles, Croatians, Serbs, 
Romanians, and numerous other small groups including Roma.4 
Such a state existed due to the combination of some early modern 
reforms, combined with numerous concessions to medieval and 
noble preferences This outdated system inherently undermined 
the monarchy’s ability to raise troops and taxes. For this reason, 
despite its great physical size and relative wealth, Austria could 
never compete alone with its French opponent.
Government functioned during the period in question exactly 
as it had in the proceeding century, with only the most minor of 
changes. The only real reforms had occurred, as mentioned above, as 
a result of numerous setbacks suffered during the Seven Years’ War. 
The Habsburg ruler for all but the very beginning of the wars of rev-
olution, Francis II, was not just a conservative, but in the end a reac-
tionary. The violence of the French social change, when measured 
against the polyglot nature of his kingdom, made it clear to him that 
such reforms were impossible, and therefore none were attempted. 
Historians, often looking to find some level of real reform among 
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the Habsburg government or army, too often are willing to mis-
take improvement for real change. During the period between 1792 
and 1801, nothing of magnitude changed for the Habsburg army. So 
command of the state, and therefore the army, remained firmly in 
the hands of the monarch, who was absolute. In Vienna day-to-day 
affairs were run by a state council, the Staatsrat, while foreign affairs 
belonged to the Haus-Hof und Staatskanlei. Finance was handled 
indirectly by the council, under the direction of a chief financial 
officer. Finances were always tenuous, and the long wars required 
the running of a sizable debt combined with the need to get foreign 
loans (these coming mostly from Great Britain) and the issuance of 
paper money. With the renewal of fighting in 1792, Austria would 
face its reoccurring problem, as laid out by its then chief financier, 
Count Chotek. War brought inflation and rising prices, which made 
an increase in taxes problematic, but a burgeoning deficit made 
internal or external loans difficult to acquire. In reaction, Chotek 
appealed for greater voluntary contributions from the great families 
and the provinces in combination with another effort to secure for-
eign, read English, loans or grants.5
The leadership of the Habsburg military, the kaiserlich-königli-
che Armee (the imperial and royal army title for the armed forces as 
a concession to the Hungarians, as the Habsburg emperor was actu-
ally their king) of course rested with the monarch, but in the field, 
and Francis only once visited the army, command was held by the 
generals. Francis was not ignorant of military affairs and had seen 
some exposure to field operations during a visit to the field in the 
Austro-Turkish War in 1788. He was not a military man, was intel-
ligent enough to realize that he would never be one, and he meddled 
only with overall strategy. This said, he often did not appoint the 
best men but rather seems to have shown a preference for mediocri-
ties to command. Likely, this came out of the fear that all Habsburg 
rulers since the Thirty Year’s War suffered—the fear of being over-
shadowed by a charismatic and successful field commander. Such 
had been the case with Wallenstein, whose success so frightened the 
Habsburg ruler of the time, Ferdinand II, that he had him assassi-
nated.6 Francis also had a clear preference for the advice of his civil-
ian advisors, chancellors like Johann Franz Baron Thugut, Johann 
Ludwig Count Cobenzl, and Franz Count Colloredo. While generally 
competent, these advisors were willing to get directly involved in 
questioning military strategy and even operations. Their authority 
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was increased in 1792 and would overlap with the uniquely Austrian 
organization known as the Hofkriegsrat. Dating to 1566 and made of 
a mixed body of military and civilian officials, the Hofkriegsrat acted 
as a planning staff and controlled the routine administration of the 
army, directing ordinance, engineering, and logistics, while issuing 
day-to-day orders. The organization was inherently bureaucratic and 
became notorious for its Byzantine abuses, where requests seemed to 
disappear into it, never to return. With a relatively small staff, some 
thirty officers and perhaps one hundred clerks, the Hofkriegsrat still 
looked to maintain control through streams of required reports that 
served to bog down the administration of the army at all levels.7 It 
was only in the initial reform efforts of the Archduke Charles in 
1801 that any real streamlining of the agencies was attempted, and 
then only without resulting in any real change.8
Habsburg generals’ ranks are numerous and often confusing, but 
should be seen as secondary in relation to the individual command-
ers’ aristocratic titles and actual appointments as commanders of 
field forces or administrative organizations. This reality meant that 
the Habsburg military establishment carried a ridiculous number of 
senior generals on its rolls, far more than could be of use, although 
they went without pay during peacetime. Since there was no perma-
nent military organizational structure above the level of the regi-
ment, all commands were created on an as-needed basis. Subdivisions 
like brigade, division, or corps, which the French would bring into 
being, would only first really appear in 1809. An army was assem-
bled as a force, given a commander, and then divided, as needed, 
into wings, or abteilungen, each again then assigned a respective 
commander. Field forces were often, in following the strategic prac-
tice of the time, divided between several armies, the commanders of 
which answered not to each other but to the emperor. This poten-
tial problem of having an unknown commander running a force of 
unknown regiments was solved, ideally, by the presence of a profes-
sional staff corps. Once war had been decided on and the regiments 
called together, the quartermaster general staff, whose director held 
the rank of lieutenant field marshal, would assign officers to each 
army. While the staff officers were intended to assist in making 
decisions, their primary responsibility often devolved into securing 
topographical intelligence.9 Since good maps were scarce, if nonex-
istent, it became a vital task for these officers to gain some notion 
of the lay of the land.
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Another issue of concern for the Habsburg army was its logisti-
cal system. Along with the notion of the Hofkriegsrat as a bureau-
cratic nightmare, the General-Kriegs-Commissariat also moved 
imperceptibly slowly, if at all. This agency was also a mix of civil-
ian-military personnel, although in time of war command was given 
to an active-duty officer. The agency’s primary task during a con-
flict was to secure both food for the men and fodder for the horses 
and draft animals. This project was done through civilian commis-
sioners, who then maintained offices in each of the provinces to 
act as go-betweens with the local governors. The system for collec-
tion and distribution of these supplies and resources was organized 
around the existence of several large-scale supply depots or maga-
zines, Hauptmagazine. Supply from there was moved to depots with 
immediate contact with the army, or Fassungsmagazine. From here, 
the army maintained substantial supply trains, wagons, and draft 
animals that then filled the roads between the main force and these 
intermediate depots. While a permanent, and therefore ideally pro-
fessional, field service existed for logistics, it remained picayune for 
the needs of the army at war and required an increase of nearly ten-
fold in personnel to even begin to meet needs.10 Added to this was 
the need to contract civilian drivers and teams to move the heavy 
artillery, field bakeries, staff facilities, and bridging equipment. As 
can be imagined, the Austrians’ army became notorious for its long 
and ponderous supply lines, which choked the roads behind an army 
and kept troop movement, on average, well below ten miles a day.
The manpower that filled the ranks of the Habsburg army came 
from a combination of voluntary enlistment and conscription. Only 
the Military Border districts, which will be mentioned below, saw 
universal service. Conscription was based on a systematic census 
that had been ordered in 1771 to list all inhabitants of Crown lands. 
From this list of men available for military service, numerous exemp-
tions were permitted, by individuals, towns, and even entire prov-
inces. Direct application of conscription was seen in the hereditary 
states, although the Tyrol remained exempt with its unique form 
of universal militia service. Critical in raising troops, Hungary and 
Austria’s Italian holdings also remained outside the system. Further, 
individual nobles, government officers, and artisans or well-to-do 
farmers were exempted.
While desperate for manpower, the state realized as well the 
necessity not to undermine the tax- and wealth-producing elements 
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among the town artisans and productive peasants. Therefore, the 
bulk of any conscription call fell upon the humblest classes, so that 
the army’s rank and file was largely made up of the poorest peasants 
and day laborers. Accustomed to hardship and back-breaking labor, 
the average recruit was physically tough and resolute, but lacking 
of any personal initiative. Once conscripted, these men were to 
serve for life, although that was shortened during the war to twenty 
years, or until they could no longer serve due to sickness or wounds. 
Despite the long term of service, it was generally assumed that dur-
ing any lengthy time of peace many of the men under arms would 
be discharged or given a long-term furlough. Due to the lengthy 
nature of the wars of the Revolution, the notion of being discharged 
for anything but incapacity was rare. As a result, conscription was 
unpopular throughout the empire, and recruiters made use of com-
pulsion and tricks to fill their quotas. For the other branches, rules 
were often different, but numbers were smaller. The cavalry was 
supposed to only accept trained men from the infantry but often 
disregarded this for men with actual riding abilities. The artillery 
and engineers remained the most selective, and smallest, and would 
only take men who were Habsburg subjects, unmarried, and literate 
in German.11
The officer corps, about which historians are always better 
informed, was one of the great pillars of the monarchy’s stabil-
ity. Its multinational makeup, and the fact that it possessed mem-
bers of unclear social origin, reflected the state itself. Most often 
higher ranks were given to noblemen coming from the Habsburg 
heartlands, with some representation from the great families (e.g., 
Esterházy, Colloredo, Kinsky, and Liechtenstein). However, the 
great nobility, who saw military life as arduous and lacking sub-
stantial reward, generally did not pursue the profession. Once hav-
ing entered the service, most of the officers received their training 
by being assigned as a cadet. They were taught the ropes, in gen-
eral, by one of the regiment’s senior sergeants and, if all went well, 
received the official rank of sublieutenant in a year. Rapidity of 
acceptance as a cadet and the rate of promotion varied of course 
with the level of noble rank the applicant brought with him. Princes 
of the blood, like the Archduke Charles, would expect near imme-
diate promotion into the general ranks, while minor nobles would 
linger for years in lesser ranks. For the minor nobles, war was the 
avenue for potential, speedy promotion. While relatively rare, it 
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was certainly possible under the demands of wartime for common-
ers to be commissioned. Up to the equivalent rank of major, promo-
tion was handled by the regimental commander-proprietor, while 
the rank of colonel and above required a nod from the emperor. 
While not recognized as ideal, ranks below major could be “pur-
chased,” albeit with approval from the regiment’s colonel. Widely 
condemned in the nineteenth century, purchasing was intended as 
a means to create a form of pension system for older officers, and a 
means to get them out of the army.12
During the mid-eighteenth century, efforts by Maria Theresa 
had made the societal position, and therefore the attractiveness, 
of being an officer much greater. In order to secure their loyalty, 
always a Habsburg anxiety, uniformed officers had been allowed 
access to the imperial court. Further, and predating the Revolution’s 
use of awards, she had created the Order of Maria Theresa, given 
for service and bravery and open to officers of all social ranks and 
religions. These and other innovations, which would create fami-
lies that became generational servants in the monarchy’s army and 
administration, did little to raise the level of military education of 
innovation. Rather, the Habsburg officer corps was well-known for 
its lack of interest in intellectual development, and most remained 
poorly educated.13 Instead, the average Austrian officer, although 
there were occasional exceptions, went through the revolutionary 
wars wed to the methods used during the Seven Year’s War, and the 
wars against the Turks. Rarely, if ever, were the monarchy’s officers 
encouraged to think for themselves, and it was even rarer that they 
should take risks.14
The army’s infantry regiments were famously separated by 
being considered either “German” or “Hungarian.” These were 
nominal misnomers, as they related primarily to the place and style 
of recruitment and to the fact that the Hungarians insisted that the 
language of drill and command in “their” regiments remain Magyar. 
In fact, the German regiments included Italians, Czechs, Poles, 
Belgians, and other non-Germans while their Hungarian counter-
parts also included Romanians and Ruthenians. The actual language 
of command was driven more by the language of the troops than by 
official designation. As mentioned above, the Military Borders of 
Croatia, Hungary, Slavonia, and Transylvania had a distinct status. 
Created as a buffer zone against the Ottomans, the regions were pop-
ulated with military colonists, known as Grenzers (Border troops). 
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The notion had been to create a permanent garrison line and to 
cut costs. During the Seven Years’ War, Maria Theresa had ordered 
these excellent light troops reorganized as line infantry in order to 
increase the size of the field armies. Understandably, their overall 
abilities were decreased, and the seventeen regiments fielded would 
not fare very well during the revolutionary wars.15
The overall kaiserlich-königliche Armee was composed of 
some fifty-seven regiments of line—or regular—infantry, seven-
teen of Grenzers, thirty-five of cavalry, and three of field artillery. 
Attached to this list were fortress artillery districts, a central logis-
tical office, and various engineers and technical troops. The infantry 
made up three-quarters of the troops available, the cavalry a quar-
ter, with the artillery numbering a few thousand. Due to cutbacks 
and lack of funds, the army had only 230,000 men ready when the 
wars started in 1792. There was no uniformity to the composition 
of troops as concerned unit size or equipment types. As an example, 
the average German regiment, when at full-strength, possessed two 
service battalions of six fusilier companies each and a stationary 
garrison battalion with only four companies. Each deployed battal-
ion had three 6-pounder cannon, including artillerists and assist-
ing troops. A regiment, whether German or Hungarian, possessed 
a so-called grenadier division of two companies. These men were 
considered the elite of the regiment and wore a traditional grena-
dier bearskin. During field service, these companies were taken to 
make ad hoc grenadier battalions, which usually served as part of 
formal reserve or third line. In sum, a regiment would have nearly 
4,500 men under arms. More likely, as in 1792, the average fusilier 
company, instead of having 4 officers and 230 men, reported 3 offi-
cers and only 120 men. Because many regiments carried more men, 
especially the invalided or sick, on their roles than were present, it 
is often very difficult to determine actual army strengths at a given 
time by simply counting regiments.16
As the wars began in 1792, the average foot soldier, or fusilier, 
was armed with either the Model 1774 or Model 1784 smoothbore 
musket. Although considered reliable, these were heavy weapons, 
even for the time. As was standard at the time, both musket types 
allowed for the addition of a socket-mounted, triangular bayonet, 
measuring over a foot in length. In reaction to the setbacks of the 
War of the First Coalition, a reform commission would introduce 
a new musket, the Model 1798, which was much superior to its 
Schneid First Pages.indb   71 4/12/15   3:40 PM
72  european armies of the french revolution
predecessors. The caliber was reduced to 17.6 mm (.69), and lighter 
brass fittings as well as an improved firing lock were added. These 
changes reduced the weapon’s weight by over a pound, a consider-
able sum. Because soldiers were able to use captured enemy ammu-
nition, and the French fired .69 rounds as well, the weapon was seen, 
even by foreigners, as a real step forward.17 Along with the musket 
and bayonet, each man carried a short saber for close-in fighting. 
Each man also carried some sixty rounds of prepared ammunition 
on his person, with another thirty-six rounds allocated to the bat-
talions’ pack animals. Although each enlisted man was allowed lit-
tle personal effects, there was a copper kettle and a tent assigned for 
every five men. This equipment remained with the approximately 
thirty packhorses and four wagons that each battalion was supposed 
to possess.
The army’s cavalry, which numbered on paper some 40,000 
strong, was often considered some of the best—horse for horse—in 
Europe. Unlike the infantry, whose units were often reduced to cadre 
strength during peace, the cavalry’s need for trained men required 
that regiments be kept at full strength all the time. In 1792, there 
were thirty-five regiments, broken down roughly between one-third 
heavy (carabiniers and cuirassiers), one third medium (dragoons and 
chevaulegers), and one third light (hussars and uhlans). Near stan-
dard organization for all types of cavalry was the basic unit of the 
squadron, about 150 troopers, then organized into divisions, usually 
three, although heavy units often had four. Habsburg cavalry was 
standard for the time, mixing the use of lighter firearms with the 
sword or lance. The heavy cavalry, especially the cuirassiers, where 
generally held in reserve during a battle as the intended “shock 
arm.” For this purpose, they possessed the heavier horse mounts 
and wore a front breastplate and metal helmet (unlike their French 
counterparts under Napoleon who wore armor on front and back). 
Although cuirassiers possessed pistols for sundry duties, their main 
weapon was a heavy, single-edged sword to be used in the charge. 
Light cavalry, the hussars, on the other hand, possessed a distinctive 
curved sword and carried a short-barreled musket.18
The third key branch, the artillery, had undergone a series of 
impressive and long-term reforms under the civic-minded Prince 
Lichtenstein in the middle of the eighteenth century but had failed 
to keep pace of French reforms in the 1780s. During peacetime, the 
monarchy’s artillery possessed no real tactical formations as such 
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and did not have permanent unit assignments as there were no per-
manent units above the regiments. Three so-called field regiments 
were mostly administrative organizations, keeping track of the 
branches’ nearly 10,000 officers and men. When the army moved to 
a war footing, these men and guns were then assigned to serve the 
battalion fieldpieces as well as the line batteries. Further personnel 
were drawn together from the Bombardeur corps and fortress artil-
lery to make up the reserve batteries assigned on the newly orga-
nized army level. These reserve guns were generally employed as 
so-called position batteries with a given place in the battle line.
All the guns and equipment relied for transportation in the field 
on the Fuhrwesencorps, which at its best often proved unreliable 
and slow. While the Austrians possessed guns in weight from 3- 
to even 24-pounders (this giving the weight of the shot), the most 
commonly deployed during the revolutionary wars were the 3-, 6-, 
and 12-pounders. The 3-pounders were generally assigned to indi-
vidual battalions, meant to bolster immediate firepower, with the 
6-pounders and 12-pounders held in reserve or position batter-
ies. Actual range of the guns varied by size, with the heavy guns 
roughly reaching about 3,000 feet and smaller guns maxing at 2,400 
feet with solid shot.19
Acting in adjunct to the three main branches were the staffs, the 
engineers, and the medical services. Once put on a war footing, 
the army immediately began looking for men to make up the great 
general staff, and the several, field-army level smaller staffs. Since 
there were always more officers than billets, finding men was not a 
problem, but finding competent men often was. Contrary to these 
logistical and planning staffs, there always existed a standing engi-
neering staff with corresponding units. The kaiserlich-königliche 
Ingenieurs Corps, under the command of a general field marshal and 
comprising nearly two hundred officers of various ranks, included 
two battalion-sized technical-engineering units. There were the sap-
pers, who specialized in building fortifications while the Minuer 
Corps covered both the attack and defense of fortified positions. A 
third group, the pioneers, served as labor for the first two organiza-
tions, and were only activated in times of war.
Medical services were inadequate at best, and in 1792 the out-
dated techniques and lack of personnel would be unable to keep 
up with the new level of losses that the French wars would cre-
ate. During a battle, dressing stations were established behind the 
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wings of the army, each with two staff surgeons and their immedi-
ate assistants. Often done in haste, operations necessarily revolved 
around the amputation of limbs. Regulations required that officers 
be treated first, with the rank and file to follow. Battalion and com-
pany surgeons, as they were titled, were not actual doctors. Most 
possessed a degree of some form, while assistant surgeons, normally 
enlisted men, got their training on the job. Complicating matters 
further was the fact that medical personnel were often not given 
officer rank and were held at the absolute bottom of the pay scale.20 
As a result, the average Austrian soldier had little hope of decent 
care if he became wounded on the field or fell sick on campaign.
During the wars of the Revolution, the Habsburg monarchy’s 
“way of war” would remain in the tradition of the previous century. 
In strategy the dominant notion was to minimize the risks taken 
by the individual army commanders while protecting a baseline of 
supply. Maneuver, especially against an enemy’s line of supply, was 
emphasized. The extreme importance placed on the maintenance 
of supply lines and access to depots explains much of the apparent 
timidity shown by Austrian forces throughout the Wars of the First 
and Second Coalition. In creating any strategy, Habsburg leaders, 
both civilian and military, were at pains to reconcile the potential 
for success with the willingness to risk the army in a battle. The 
ultimate achievement for any army commander would have been 
to maneuver one’s opponents off their line of supply, forcing them 
to retreat (or surrender!). Such success would allow for detached 
corps to blockade and reduce enemy fortresses, which could then 
be converted to friendly depots and would open a new, secure, base-
line.21 In the field then, the Austrians would employ, on what was 
essentially an operational level, the cordon system. The intention 
was for the army, or armies, to cover an entire region, with a series 
of detachments strung between fortress strongpoints. Such a line 
would force the enemy to move against the fortresses, to blockade 
or besiege them, allowing the Austrians time to gather forces for a 
countermove. While this system had a clear mathematical appeal, 
and seemed to minimize the ability of incompetent commanders to 
err, it was brittle and outdated. Worse for the monarchy, the French 
quickly bested the system with hard-marching troops, limited logis-
tical needs, and dynamic leadership.22
In tactics there was mirroring of the strategic and operational. 
Throughout the wars, the Austrian army would retain the essential 
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battlefield that had been standard in the Seven Years’ War. Basically, 
doctrine called for the deployment of the infantry into two lines, 
preferably anchored on a physical barrier such as a river or woods, 
with a third, smaller line behind that in reserve. The line was 
then separated into a center with left and right flanks. Senior regi-
ments and the senior subordinate general commanded on the right. 
Along the line was then placed the artillery, the position batteries 
being essentially immobile, which together with the infantry was 
intended to create a wall of fire. On the wings, the army’s cavalry 
played out the role of blunting any moves by enemy cavalry or any 
attempt to turn the flank. Since this formation assumed a long, rigid 
front (this meant up to eight infantry regiments and three cavalry 
regiments per flank), it was best suited to the defense. Deployment 
in rough or hilly terrain, or anything more than a modest advance 
through the lines into disorder, made the force impossible for a sin-
gle commander to control. Specific infantry regulations called for 
firing within the battalions by platoon, which was intended to give 
a near-constant effect. It also meant that no battalion was without a 
reserve of shot if it came under an unexpected cavalry charge. While 
all the infantry went into battle with their bayonets fixed, the real 
emphasis was, and remained, a controlled fire. Because of their expe-
rience in the Turkish wars, where they had been badly outnumbered 
in cavalry, the Austrians still made use of condensed battalion-
sized formations called “close-columns.” The formation was gen-
erally applied in the presence of French cavalry, or when moving to 
the pursuit, but it required time to form and reduced fire and speed 
substantially. The formation made clear that many Habsburg com-
manders had little faith in their troops’ ability to maneuver, as the 
closed column gave the commander much greater tactical control 
over the army.23
The monarchy’s cavalry also suffered from outdated notions of 
training and deployment. Operating during the wars under the reg-
ulations of 1784, which assigned complicated procedures for fire, 
the cavalry continued to prefer, both heavy and light, the shock of 
the charge. For the charge, squadrons were formed up three ranks 
deep, the men boot to boot. The squadrons would advance at a con-
trolled trot to maintain order, and then at a few hundred feet from 
the enemy receive the order to charge, which was done at a gallop. 
Despite the quality of many of its regiments, both heavy and light 
cavalry were poorly used by the Austrians. Rather than massing the 
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heavy cavalry, it was often used in limited numbers and with poor 
coordination. The army’s hussars were also not used effectively for 
scouting, their ideal task, but rather were given out by squadron to 
screen or accompany smaller forces of detached infantry. Finally, 
the artillery had no specific rules for tactical engagement other than 
to add their fire to the line. Sometimes the heavier guns were com-
bined into line of fire, rather than just the 3-pounders, often to great 
effect, but this was not a set tactic. Since the Austrian guns and pro-
jectile weights were inferior to their French counterparts, and since 
they were deployed in small groupings, their impact was always 
limited or inconsistent.
The Austrian armies that took the field, with their numer-
ous allies, against the French in the War of the First (1792–97) and 
Second (1798–1802) Coalitions were, as has been made apparent 
above, a solid if somewhat obsolescent force. In the examination of 
the army through these long years of conflict, it is never clear that 
an overall grand strategy emerges. What, in the end, was the enunci-
ated state policy of the monarchy concerning revolutionary France? 
With only the most minimal exceptions, the Austrians under first 
Leopold, and then Francis, never seem to have called for a full-scale 
war to remove the republic and restore the Bourbons to the throne. 
Perhaps the monumental nature of the task of restoration, espe-
cially after 1794, and the backing of questionable allies like Russia 
and Prussia, made this a non-reality. Instead, it appears, by way of 
the plans and cordon system employed, as a series of wars meant 
to restore the status quo prior to 1792. If that is the case, then the 
overall management of these two wars by the monarchy can be seen 
as an effective implementation of statecraft through a necessarily 
limited military tool. For it is impossible to suppose, as has been 
stated already, that Austrian leaders such as Francis or his reform-
minded brother the Archduke Charles, had any notion that French 
style change was anything but impossible and also undesirable.24 
Therefore, by the end of 1801 the monarchy, although at the cost of 
men, money, and some territories had maintained itself intact in the 
face of revolutionary fervor.
The War of the First Coalition was in a sense a defensive war 
for the monarchy. Clearly uncertain how to react in the face of the 
radical changes then under way in France, the Austrian emperor 
would sign a defensively oriented convention with Prussia at the 
Declaration of Pillnitz on 27 August 1791. An incensed Directory, 
Schneid First Pages.indb   76 4/12/15   3:40 PM
the austrian army  77
reacting for self-serving reasons, would then declare war in April of 
the next year on Leopold, not Austria the state, in an effort to reflect 
France’s new calls to liberty.25 The first year of the war, which pitted 
the novice and disorganized armies of the French against the com-
bined forces of Austria and Prussia saw little real fighting. Rather, 
neither Austria nor Prussia trusted each other, nor did it appear that 
either was willing to chance the loss of Polish territory in order to 
“save” France. It is also clear that the Austrian army was ill-prepared 
for war. It lacked all the needed resources, the victim of tightfisted 
policies and severe spending reductions under Leopold II. Further, 
the promised forces of the Holy Roman Empire, which were called 
into service by Emperor Francis, failed to materialize.
By late 1792, the French, recovering from the withdrawal of 
the Austro-Prussian force, went over to the offensive, attacking 
Austrian Belgium. In an attempt to recover their position, the allies 
also moved to the offensive in early 1793, forming a wide cordon line 
running through Belgium and Rhenish Germany under the Prince of 
Coburg. Again, Austrian plans were upset by a grinding lack of sup-
plies, the slow movement of the troops, and the indecisive nature 
of its leadership. Despite some hard-fought victories and the failure 
of the French commander Charles Dumouriez, Coburg achieved lit-
tle. This success was about to be shattered, however, as the French, 
under the leadership of Lazare Carnot, would produce larger and 
now veteran armies. By the end of 1793, the French had stabilized 
their situation in Holland and Belgium. Further complicating mat-
ters for Austria would be reduction and soon the withdrawal of the 
Prussians from the anti-French alliance. French offensives planned 
for 1794 would therefore strike against an Austrian army that was 
increasingly suffering from overuse, undersupply, and defeatism. 
Concentric attacks by French armies in the spring served to drive 
most of Austria’s remaining allies out of the picture while also driv-
ing Coburg from Belgium itself. By October, Holland had fallen.26
The start of 1795 saw Austria’s Prussian, Russian, and Portuguese 
allies gone and the British field forces evacuated from the Continent. 
Still, confident of possible success, mostly the result of internal 
French political upheavals, Austria allied again with Russia. This 
hope ignored the fact that the army was exhausted and incapa-
ble of major field operations. Happily for the Habsburgs, this was 
also the case for the French. By September, the Austrians resumed 
their cordon strategy, deploying two armies of nearly 200,000 men 
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along a four-hundred-mile front. Modest French efforts at an offen-
sive failed, and by the start of 1796 the monarchy’s prospects looked 
somewhat renewed.
The campaigns of 1796–97, which ended the War of the First 
Coalition, saw Austria’s greatest victories of the entire period dashed 
by the rising Napoleon. Treating Germany as the main area of opera-
tions, the Austrians found a successful commander in the Archduke 
Charles. Having retreated in the face of the advance of two inde-
pendent French armies for several weeks, the archduke then turned 
and gained the position between them through a pair of battles at 
Amberg and Würzburg in August and September. He then pressed 
his advance, driving the French all the way back over the Rhine, 
and was preparing to move farther when disaster in Italy called 
him away.27 While successful in Germany, the old Austrian tactic 
of holding lines played into the hands of the energetic and reck-
lessly bold General Bonaparte. He quickly destroyed the Austrians’ 
Piedmontese ally and then defeated a series of Austrian armies, cap-
turing the last nearly intact. When Charles arrived in early 1797 to 
fix things, he quickly found that the army was in a shambles and 
pressed for peace. Furious, but with little choice, Francis accepted 
an armistice and then a peace treaty dictated by Napoleon. The 1796 
campaign in Germany had shown that, with proper leadership and 
some good luck, the monarchy’s army could still be successful. It 
was, however, to be the last real success until 1809.
The War of the Second Coalition was an even greater disappoint-
ment than the first, and did little but further damage the army. It 
was, unfortunately for Austria, unavoidable in the face of further 
French offensives taken by the Directory. Trying to stem the French 
tide, Austria looked for allies in Russia and Great Britain, but would 
provide the bulk of the troops itself. Some military reforms had been 
attempted in the brief respite of 1798–99.28 As Archduke Charles 
had correctly asserted, it would be impossible to bring reform with-
out a sustained period of peace. Changes that did occur were essen-
tially superficial, dealing more with organization and increase in the 
number of regiments, a new musket, and some uniform simplifi-
cations. The argument between emphasizing skirmish warfare and 
maintaining unit discipline and ranks remained, but the traditional-
ists carried the day.29
The initial campaigns of 1799 saw an effort of the Austrians 
and the Russians to coordinate military efforts against the French 
Schneid First Pages.indb   78 4/12/15   3:40 PM
the austrian army  79
in what is today modern Switzerland. Due to mutual distrust, 
these efforts came to naught. Neither the Archduke Charles, com-
manding in Southern Germany, nor Marshal Alexander Suvorov in 
Switzerland, could clearly defeat the French. Instead, the two men 
came to despise each other, both blaming the other for their fail-
ures. Of importance was the fact that the Russian army was so lack-
ing in logistical support that the entire force had to be maintained 
by Austrian officers. By December of 1799, the coalition had disin-
tegrated, and the Russians withdrew.30 Further, the archduke was 
relieved for reasons of health. The campaign season of 1800 opened 
with a critical change: France was now under the singular direction of 
Napoleon, now dictator. He intended to focus his effort in Germany 
with General Jean Moreau’s army of 100,000 while a reserve force of 
60,000 assembled to support it. In Italy, he left a covering force under 
General André Masséna.31 The Austrian plans were ambitious, with 
a main army, some 90,000 under Baron Michael Melas, advancing 
from the Maritime Alps on Lyon in France. Successful at first, Melas 
was forced to turn and fight a separate French army under Napoleon 
that was threatening his line of supply. Napoleon defeated Melas in 
the close-run battle at Marengo and forced the Austrian to sign an 
armistice. The dispersed Austrian forces in Germany, faced with a 
reinforced Moreau, and deployed in a cordon line, also accepted an 
armistice that ran to 13 November 1800.
Emperor Francis, with the advice of Baron Thugut and the 
promises of British funding, decided to renew the war.32 New 
recruits were found, but the army remained demoralized. When 
the Archduke Charles turned down command of the army, Francis 
decided in favor of his amiable—albeit only eighteen-year-old—
brother, the Archduke John, to take command. When the armistice 
came to an official end on 27 November 1800, both sides took the 
offensive. Moreau’s plan was simple; he would advance his army to 
the Inn River and then attack whatever Austrians he could find. It 
is not clear what broader plans he may have made, except to press 
east along the left bank of the Danube in the general direction of 
Vienna. Moreau probably assumed that such a move would force the 
Austrians to battle, and they obliged him. The Austrian plan, the 
product of the ambitious and optimistic Colonel Franz Weyrother, 
was complicated and called for maneuvering against the French 
line of communications. Having concentrated the army on the Inn 
River, John’s forces would move west and reach the Isar River in just 
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three days. They would then cross the river at the town of Landshut, 
wheel south, crushing Moreau’s left flank and thereby cutting his 
line of communications. The French then would be forced to yield 
their hold on the left bank of the Danube, potentially allowing the 
Austrians to regain their losses of the summer. Weyrother’s plan, 
unrealistic in the face of the French plan, made less sense consider-
ing the cold, rainy weather and the forest roads the troops would be 
forced to cross.33
The battle occurred in the area surrounding the small Bavarian 
village of Hohenlinden, which sits fifty miles west of Munich and 
just north of the Inn River valley. The battle is memorable for the 
fact that this decisive Austrian defeat ended the War of the Second 
Coalition and was the last real victory for an army of the French 
Republic. Despite its importance, Hohenlinden was overshadowed 
by Napoleon’s somewhat less spectacular, but soon enshrined, vic-
tory at Marengo, Italy, in June of that same year.
The town of Hohenlinden would figure prominently in both 
armies’ plans. It was the hub for the roads that ran through the area 
and was therefore a key to operations. The town was all the more 
critical as the area between the Isar and Inn Rivers was heavily 
wooded and hilly, meaning that armies could only move effectively 
by road, especially with their artillery and baggage. It also meant 
that the Austrians and her German allies, trained to fight in tra-
ditional, eighteenth-century fashion, were ill suited for the terrain. 
However, the revolutionary French troops were now famous for their 
abilities to fight dispersed in any and all terrains, and to act indepen-
dently at all levels.
Despite all these factors, the initial Austrian advance caught 
the French by surprise. Moreau, who was notoriously slow in initi-
ating operations, now found himself temporarily on the defensive. 
Unfortunately, the Austrians had little idea of the actual French posi-
tion. Worse still, the poor weather and the troops’ inability to per-
form hard marches immediately slowed the Austrian advance to 
a crawl. It rained incessantly each day, and the dirt roads quickly 
turned into a quagmire, with regiments suffering from excessive 
straggling. As a result, both Weyrother and Franz Baron Lauer now 
advised the archduke to abandon his sweep around the French left for 
a more economic and direct move against Munich. This made sense 
in that Munich had a number of good roads running to it, which 
would shorten the marching needed. It also meant that the Austrian 
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army would pass through Hohenlinden, some eighteen miles from its 
present position, which is also where the French were now headed. 
It was, for the Austrians, the worst possible battlefield in the worst 
possible weather.34
The armies made first contact on 1 December, at the village 
of Ampfing, which sits immediately to the east of Hohenlinden. 
Under the command of General Michel Ney, the French advance 
guard fought a pitched battle against superior Austrian numbers but 
was compelled to retire after six hours. In a precursor of what was 
to come, the French troops inflicted heavy losses on the Austrians, 
showing markedly superior abilities to maneuver. John was buoyed 
by this initial success, despite the losses, and believed that the 
French were retreating. To capitalize on this, he ordered a general 
advance in columns to make the best use of the available roads. In 
doing so, he hoped to advance his 64,000 men across a broad front 
and on roads that traveled mostly east–west, which very much lim-
ited the ability for the independent columns to support each other. 
In his race to catch the supposedly retreating French, John further 
exhausted his worn and wet troops, who did not share his elation at 
a potential victory.
Moreau was again caught off guard by the Austrian attack but 
now rose to the occasion. Looking at the map, he quickly realized 
that, with some planning and hard marching, the chance to catch 
and crush the Austrian army was at hand. Seeing that the Austrians 
were advancing in belief of a French retreat, Moreau ordered his 
units to abandon the higher, wooded ground immediately before 
Hohenlinden, playing on John’s hopes and creating a trap. The divi-
sions that Moreau deployed, despite being on lower ground, sat at 
the points where the forest roads first came into the open before 
the town. This meant that the Austrians would be forced to try and 
deploy under fire from already drawn-up French troops. It also meant 
that the Austrian artillery would be strung out along the road and 
would never come into play. If the planned worked, the French divi-
sions under Generals Claude Juste Alexandre Legrand, Emmanuel de 
Grouchy, Jean d’Hautpoul, and Ney, with 32,000 men, would hold 
the Austrian main advance in place on the anvil while the ham-
mer swept in from the right. Marching as quickly as possible, con-
sidering the wet conditions, 20,000 troops under Generals Antoine 
Richepanse and Charles Decaen were moving alongside roads to get 
behind and into the Austrian left.35
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Both armies spent 2 December on the move, the Austrians slug-
ging along the roads toward Hohenlinden and the French either draw-
ing up behind the town or marching east, parallel to the enemy. Both 
armies suffered from a combination of rain, sleet, and snow, and were 
now cold and wet. The French were aware that a battle was in the off-
ing; the Austrian and German troops were simply trying to keep their 
formations. The day of 3 December began with the front Austrian 
columns making contact with the French near Hohenlinden, which 
they assumed was a rear guard. The battle evolved slowly with the 
piecemeal commitment of battalions and squadrons in localized 
actions. Within a few hours, however, the tide of battle around the 
town was turning and the Austrians were wavering.
As the situation grew worse for the Austrians along their front, 
the struggling troops of Richepanse and Decaen struck the left, with 
Richepanse nearly hitting into the enemy rear. Again, the fighting 
was piecemeal and confused, with units moving to the “sound of 
the guns” and being committed as they became available. Although 
the Austrians showed the will to resist briefly, the entire left flank 
soon collapsed, followed by the front line. Retreat almost imme-
diately devolved into route, and much of the artillery and baggage 
abandoned as troops fled or surrendered. The real fighting was over 
by the early afternoon, and the Austrian army was in full flight.36
The Battle of Hohenlinden was a clear tactical and strategic suc-
cess for the French. The disaster ended the Austrian army’s ability to 
further resist a French advance, and Moreau seized several key for-
tresses and depots, allowing him to threaten Vienna. The situation 
left the monarchy with no option but to sue for peace, ending the 
war. The costs of the battle, fought primarily on 3 December, had 
been crushing for Austria and its allies. The army lost 4,485 casu-
alties and over 7,000 prisoners of war, as well as leaving behind 50 
artillery pieces. The French losses numbered approximately 3,000. 
After the battle, the Austrian commanders looked to transfer the 
blame, and the Archduke John saw the defeat in the failure of his 
leaders to move quickly.37
The calamitous defeat at the hands of Moreau in the battle was 
an anticlimactic and rather predictable end for the Austrian war 
effort during the wars of the French Revolution. Having reluctantly 
entered the war in 1792, the monarchy’s army soldiered through a 
string of tactical and strategic defeats. Yet that same army remained 
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intact and would enter into a reform period in 1801, the first of 
two, under the promising leadership of the Archduke Charles. As 
has been often noted in the numerous works of the late premier 
English-language historian of the Habsburg military, Gunther E. 
Rothenberg, the Austrian army was what it could be.38 It was impos-
sible for the army to reform in any fashion similar to the French 
army because it lacked the potential for the necessary radical social 
changes. To have changed in such a matter would have negated the 
monarchy itself. Rather, the army remained a pillar of the empire, if 
badly beaten, guaranteeing the House of Habsburg’s rule, the reason 
it had been created 150 years earlier.
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